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The Sharing Economy and related platform technologies have
disrupted work, consumption, and business in ways unimaginable
even a decade ago. Creating great wealth and opportunity for some,
the Sharing Economy has equally undermined job security and
safety for many others. One challenge for regulators, legal advisors,
and scholars is developing a rigorous analytical model for these related phenomena. We present the first comprehensive legal framework for distinguishing and analyzing the various components of the
Sharing Economy and their interrelationships. Our analysis is
based on contract law and property law, providing a delimitation
within the Sharing Economy and platform technologies based on legal categories. Our approach provides a foundation for analytical
rigor that has been absent to date.
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INTRODUCTION
The Sharing Economy is one of the most important social, economic, and legal phenomena in the world today. Yet there is no generally accepted definition of this phenomenon. A variety of terms
are used to describe it, including the “Sharing Economy,” “CrowdBased Capitalism,” “Collaborative Consumption,” “Gig Economy,”
and “The Mesh.”1 It represents a new type of behavior and practice
1

“Sharing Economy” is the most accepted term to denominate this phenomenon. See
Shu-Yi Oei, The Trouble with Gig Talk: Choice of Narrative and the Worker Classification
Fights, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 107 n.1 (2018) (providing empirical evidence
about why the term “Sharing Economy” has been the dominant term used to describe the
phenomenon); Kellen Zale, Sharing Property, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 526 n. 85 (2016)
(arguing that “the term ‘sharing economy’ appears to be the de facto term being used by
regulators and policymakers, as well as the media and the companies themselves.”); Chris
J. Martin, The Sharing Economy: A Pathway to Sustainability or a Nightmarish Form of
Neoliberal Capitalism?, 121 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 149, 151 (2016) (concluding that the
Sharing Economy has become the predominant concept). However, other terms have been
proposed, such as: (1) Collaborative Consumption, e.g., RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS,
WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS: THE RISE OF COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION (2010); (2)
Collaborative Economy, e.g., Resolution on a European Agenda for the Collaborative
Economy, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM P8_TA(2017)0271) (2017); (3) Crowd-Based
Capitalism, e.g., ARUN SUNDARARAJAN, THE SHARING ECONOMY: THE END OF
EMPLOYMENT AND THE RISE OF CROWD-BASED CAPITALISM (2016); (4) the Mesh, e.g., LISA
GANSKY, THE MESH: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SHARING (2010); (5) Peer-to-Peer
Market, e.g., Liran Einav et al., Peer-to-Peer Markets, 8 ANN. REV. ECON. 615 (2016); (6)

2021]

THE SHARING ECONOMY & THE “PUP MODEL”

999

that is rapidly spreading and massively disrupting established business practices, business models, and regulatory frameworks around
the globe.2 At a most basic level, the Sharing Economy is facilitated
by a new technology where one party provides goods and services
(“Provider”) to another party (“User”) using an online platform operated by a third party (“Platform Operator”).3 This new technology
creates many innovation opportunities for new business models as
well as a new set of legal relations, a new legal structure or model.
In this Article, this new legal structure or model is referred to as the
‘PUP model’ (Platform operator-User-Provider model).
Prior scholarship has conflated several distinct phenomena—
lumping together different economies with technologies and
Peer-to-Peer Economy or P2P Economy, e.g., Jenny Kassan & Janelle Orsi, The Legal
Landscape of the Sharing Economy, 27 J. ENV’T L. & LITIG. 1, 5 (2012); (7) Peer-to-Peer
Consumption, e.g., Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U.
L. REV. 989, 991 (2016); (8) Disaggregation Economy, e.g., Daniel E. Rauch & David
Schleicher, Like Uber, But for Local Government Law: The Future of Local Regulation of
the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 901 (2015); (9) Access-Based Consumption, e.g.,
Fleura Bardhi & Giana M. Eckhardt, Access-Based Consumption: The Case of Car
Sharing, 39 J. CONSUMER RES. 881 (2012); (10) Gig Economy, e.g., Valerio De Stefano,
The Rise of the Just-in-Time Workforce: On-Demand Work, Crowdwork, and Labor
Protection in the Gig-Economy, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471 (2016); (11) Platform
Economy, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87 (2016); (12)
On-Demand Economy, e.g., Daniel G. Cockayne, Sharing and Neoliberal Discourse: The
Economic Function of Sharing in the Digital On-Demand Economy, 77 GEOFORUM 73
(2016); (13) 1099 Economy, e.g., Mark J. Loewenstein, Agency Law and the New
Economy, 72 BUS. LAW. 1009, 1010 n. 2 (2017); (14) Ubernomics, e.g., Michael Motala,
The “Taxi Cab Problem” Revisited: Law and Ubernomics in the Sharing Economy, 31
BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 467 (2016); (15) Bit Economy, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo,
Regulation of Share Economy: A Consistently Changing Environment, in DIGITAL
REVOLUTION: CHALLENGES FOR CONTRACT LAW IN PRACTICE 89, 91 (Reiner Schulze &
Dirk Staudenmayer eds., 2016); (16) Participatory Consumption, e.g., Opinion of the
European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Collaborative or Participatory
Consumption, a Sustainability Model for the 21st Century’, EUR. ECON. & SOC. COMM.
(2014/C 177/01) (2014); (17) Relationship Economy, e.g., JANELLE ORSI, PRACTICING LAW
IN THE SHARING ECONOMY: HELPING PEOPLE BUILD COOPERATIVES, SOCIAL ENTERPRISES,
AND LOCAL SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES (2012); (18) Cooperative Economy, e.g., id.; (19)
Grassroots Economy, e.g., id.; (20) New Economy, e.g., id.; (21) Leasing, Subleasing, or
Licensing Economy, e.g., Gregory M. Stein, Inequality in the Sharing Economy, 85
BROOK. L. REV. 787, 796 (2020); and (22) ‘Go-it-Alone’ Economy, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel,
Pooling and Unpooling in the Uber Economy, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 265, 286 (2017).
2
Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between: Regulating the Shared Economy, 43 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 31, 32–34 (2016).
3
See infra Part I – Theoretical Context.
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business models. The judiciary, unsurprisingly primarily American,
has in turn struggled to understand the various phenomena under
consideration. Because of this, uncertainty has emerged in the
American legal system and beyond.4 The lack of appropriate categories has destabilized the law in and around the use of the PUP
model.5
Accordingly, creating a legal definition and an analytical framework of the Sharing Economy in the first instance is of paramount
concern. Defining the Sharing Economy—a term which we believe
is of limited use—provides the foundation for an analytical framework. Once we have established this broader framework, we believe
that we are better able to understand, locate, and analyze the nature
and activities of the PUP model. In other words, a legal analysis of
the PUP model and its subclasses goes hand in hand with a legal
analysis of the Sharing Economy, the Access Economy, the Gift
Economy, and the Exchange Economy. The definitions of these categories are of paramount concern, allowing a more precise analysis
and foundation on which future regulation can be based.6
This Article provides a framework for analyzing the PUP model
and its subclasses, and places them in the context of the four economies to facilitate their legal analysis. The Article pursues this aim in
four main parts. The theoretical context of the definition of the
4

Compare O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(holding that plaintiffs, Uber drivers, were Uber’s presumptive employees) with Lawson
v. Grubhub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (categorising the plaintiff, a
Grubhub delivery person, as an independent contractor of this company). Rashmi DyalChand has explained that “[r]egulators have responded to the new business models
proliferating in the sharing economy with a mixture of confusion, indignation, and alarm.
In general, regulations have been reactive and piecemeal, rather than proactive or
comprehensive. At times, regulators in different states and at the federal level have treated
the same business practices quite differently. Often, in their haste to protect some market
participants, they have ignored the needs of others.” RASHMI DYAL-CHAND,
COLLABORATIVE CAPITALISM IN AMERICAN CITIES: REFORMING URBAN MARKET
REGULATIONS 193 (2018).
5
As Judge Logue said in McGillis v. Department of Economic Opportunity, “we must
decide whether a multi-faceted product of new technology should be fixed into either the
old square hole or the old round hole of existing legal categories, when neither is a perfect
fit.” 210 So. 3d 220, 223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
6
See Zale, supra note 1, at 510 (arguing that “[d]eveloping a conceptual framework to
ground the discourse about the sharing economy is critical from both a theoretical and
practical perspective.”).
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Sharing Economy is revisited and expanded upon in Part I. This part
explores the ambiguity in the concept of the Sharing Economy and
the problems this has posed from the point of view of legal categories. Part II provides the theoretical foundation in property law and
contract law that is used throughout the Article. Part III includes a
semantic and legal analysis of the terms sharing and economy,
providing guidance for the next part of the Article. Part IV, the crux
of the Article, proposes a legal definition of the phenomenon.
I. THEORETICAL CONTEXT
At its core, the Sharing Economy allows the creation of a business model where Platform Operators aggregate supply and demand
via an interactive network, providing opportunity for people and
businesses to meet their needs and put inactive assets or time into
economic productivity.7 For instance, Uber aggregates information
from Uber drivers (Providers) and Uber passengers (Users) through
its platform and matches supply and demand for transportation services. Uber drivers, in turn, harness the idle capacity of their vehicles by providing these services.
The Platform Operators aggregate previously disaggregated information, consolidate it, and form a market which in turn they target to a larger audience: Users.8 This technology is successfully
exploited by companies such as Uber, Airbnb, and TaskRabbit.9
A number of significant claims have been made about it, including
changes in the economy and the creation of new economies, often
denominated the ‘Sharing Economy.’
Since the beginning of the Sharing Economy,10 the economy and
society have been affected in a multitude of ways, both positively

7

Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 1, at 917.
Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53 HARV. J.
ON LEG. 147, 164 (2016).
9
Id. at 149.
10
The beginning of the “Sharing Economy” can be traced back to the Global Financial
Crisis when the sharing firms Airbnb (2008) and Uber (2009) emerged, and the term
“Sharing Economy” was first mentioned (2008). See Lobel, supra note 1, at 94 (arguing
that “while the timeline is not set in stone, it is useful to mark 2008, with the founding of
8
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and negatively. On the positive side, the Sharing Economy has created wealth,11 job opportunities,12 supplementary income, 13 flexibility,14 inclusion,15 and a broader variety of services and products
for consumers.16 On the other hand, the Sharing Economy has

Airbnb as the rise of the new wave of the platform—a stunning number of fast-growing of
algorithm-enabled cyber-places where constituents transact.”); Thomas Puschmann &
Rainer Alt, Sharing Economy, 58 BUS. INFO. SYS. ENG’G 93, 95 (2016) (contending that
the term “Sharing Economy” was first mentioned by Lawrence Lessig in his 2008 book
Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy); Inara Scott & Elizabeth
Brown, Redefining and Regulating the New Sharing Economy, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 553,
558 n.21 (2017) (explaining that even though Martin Weitzman wrote a book titled The
Share Economy in 1984, this work is not about the phenomenon of the “Sharing Economy”
being analyzed).
11
PricewaterhouseCoopers projects that the total global revenues from five Sharing
Economy sectors―travel, car sharing, finance, staffing, and music and video streaming―
will increase from $15 billion to around $35 billion by 2025.
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE SHARING ECONOMY 1, 14, available at https://www.pw
c.fr/fr/assets/files/pdf/2015/05/pwc_etude_sharing_economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/S926NRJV].
12
See, e.g., Shep Hyken, The Gig Economy Opens the Door for Employment
Opportunities, FORBES (July 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/shephyken/2018/07
/29/the-gig-economy-opens-the-door-for-employment-opportunities/#7f8ca9567662
[https://perma.cc/E7VV-S4PT].
13
See, e.g., Ruth Fowler, The Reluctant Airbnb Host: Why I Rent My Spare Bedroom to
Pay My Own Rent, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technol
ogy/2017/aug/01/airbnb-host-rent-housing-crisis-los-angeles [https://perma.cc/6HHRW8ZJ]; see also John Collet, More Australians Boost Their Income Through the Sharing
Economy, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (May 1, 2018), https://www.smh.com.au/money/pl
anning-and-budgeting/more-australians-boost-their-income-through-the-sharingeconomy-20180427-p4zc25.html [https://perma.cc/JG23-FFBK].
14
See, e.g., S. Kumar, 3 Reasons to Cheer Uber and the Sharing Economy, FORTUNE
(July 20, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/07/20/uber-and-the-sharing-economy/
[https://perma.cc/8N7W-JXLH].
15
See, e.g., Sam Levin, Airbnb Vows to be First Company to Defy Trump and Keep
Employing Dreamers, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/sep/07/silicon-valley-executives-dreamers-daca-trump
[https://perma.cc/X2TQ-KK9J].
16
See, e.g., Suzanne Bearne, The Sharing Economy: A Money-Making Space Made for
Startups, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/small-businessnetwork/2015/apr/08/sharing-economy-startups-airbnb-business [https://perma.cc/ZU34ZUQ4].
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facilitated murder,17 rape,18 suicide,19 discrimination,20 fraud,21 low
wages, job insecurity,22 and other negative effects.23
The term “Sharing Economy” draws upon ideas of altruistic behavior in daily life.24 One can think of an example where a person
may pick up a coworker to share the drive to work. There is nothing
unique or special about this activity. It is simply a demonstration of
altruism, generosity, and collaboration. What is significant in the
absence of the technologically facilitated Sharing Economy is that
the behavior is limited to two people acting in a personal, non-commercial context. The car owner is using private resources while the
coworker is not looking for a commercial arrangement but is relying
on personal goodwill. While a change in the behavior—such that it
becomes a regular event—may lead the coworker to offer some
money to offset the costs of operating the vehicle, it remains fundamentally a personal, non-commercial arrangement. What then shifts

17

See, e.g., Emma Younger, Airbnb Murder Accused Placed Guest in Headlock After
Dispute Over Rent, Court Told, ABC (May 22, 2018), https://www.abc.net.au/news/201805-22/ramis-jonuzi-melbourne-airbnb-guest-death-brighton-east-court/9787996
[https://perma.cc/X6GB-H3J8].
18
See, e.g., Keith L. Alexander, Uber Driver Convicted of Raping Female Passenger,
Faces 20 Years in Prison, WASH. POST. (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.co
m/local/public-safety/uber-driver-convicted-of-raping-female-passenger-faces-20-yearsin-prison/2018/08/10/8221ca48-9cb8-11e8-8d5e-c6c594024954_story.html
[https://perma.cc/9M2Z-WN73].
19
See, e.g., Tyler Pager & Emily Palmer, Uber Driver’s Death Marks Seventh ForHire Driver Suicide Within a Year, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/10/07/nyregion/uber-driver-suicide-for-hire-taxis-new-york.html
[https://perma.cc/EZW7-VZRA].
20
See, e.g., Elaine Glusac, As Airbnb Grows, so do Claims of Discrimination,
N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/travel/airbnbdiscrimination-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/V7PP-9TMQ].
21
See, e.g., Rebecca Smithers, I Was Conned by a Fraudster Pretending to Be an
Airbnb Host, THE GUARDIAN (May 8, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/money/2017/
may/08/conned-by-fraudster-airbnb-host [https://perma.cc/4VAC-2EY8].
22
See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, False Freedom: Sharing the Scraps from the Perilous
Gig Economy, LITERARY HUB (Aug. 7, 2019), https://lithub.com/false-freedom-sharingthe-scraps-from-the-perilous-gig-economy [https://perma.cc/4QQV-H52E].
23
See Frank Pasquale, Two Narratives of Platform Capitalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 309, 311 (2016) (contrasting the arguments supporting the conventional narrative
and the counternarrative of the Sharing Economy).
24
See Abbey Stemler, The Myth of the Sharing Economy and Its Implications for
Regulating Innovation, 67 EMORY L.J. 197, 197 (2017).
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with the introduction of the PUP model? And further, when does it
shift?
The critical factor disrupting these traditional relationships is a
technological innovation: the development of the internet-based
platforms. These platforms create a much wider web of interactivity
providing an opportunity for people to meet or expand their private
networks, allowing them greater access to people with certain needs
or resources. This allows sharing at an unprecedented scale. It could
indeed generate a Sharing Economy if sharing were to continue as
the institutional norm and the platform was operated on a non-profit
basis. At this point, however, the institutional norms often breakdown. Some Platform Operators have looked for ways to profit and
the denomination “Sharing Economy” becomes less applicable and
of questionable accuracy.25
Platform Operators are, for the most part, not altruistically motivated actors interested in sharing. Rather, as argued below, they
are profit-driven entities.26 Accordingly, they have discovered ways
to monetize the otherwise altruistic sharing behavior.27 They have
shifted the use of the technology from sharing to profit-making, thus
commoditizing altruism. However, they have continued to be characterized as contributing to the Sharing Economy despite not actually “sharing.”28
Different kinds of practices and transactions are included under
the concept of the “Sharing Economy,”29 causing confusion in defining the phenomenon. Activities such as clothes swapping, home
swapping, lending couches, dating platforms, online stores, a wide
variety of services (such as car transportation, delivery, food preparation, dog walking, pet sitting, online streaming, personal parking

25

See infra pp. 1037–42.
See infra p. 1042.
27
See infra p. 1042.
28
See infra note 134.
29
Juliet Schor explains that “[m]any organizations have been eager to position
themselves under the ‘big tent’ of the sharing economy because of the positive symbolic
meaning of sharing, the magnetism of innovative digital technologies, and the rapidly
growing volume of sharing activity.” Juliet Schor, Debating the Sharing Economy,
GREAT TRANSITION INITIATIVE (Oct. 2014), https://greattransition.org/publication/debatin
g-the-sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/2TZS-JTWU].
26
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valet, and butler, legal, medical, financial, and educational services),
and renting of goods (such as film equipment, watches, houses, toys,
offices, parking spaces, household tools, and bikes), are examples
of transactions and practices that are bundled together under the
term “Sharing Economy.”30 This situation is problematic because it
prevents appropriate delimitation of the phenomenon, which, in
turn, hinders legal analysis and appropriate regulation.31
As the Sharing Economy spread, scholarship about the new
“sharing” model emerged and became a hot topic. The Sharing
Economy has been a topic of research in different disciplines, such
as economics,32 geography,33 tourism,34 sociology,35 business
30
Janelle Orsi, for instance, includes in the scope of the “Sharing Economy” the
following practices: cohousing communities, community gardens, social enterprises,
community-owned enterprises, shared commercial kitchens, car-sharing groups, ecovillages, local currencies, barter networks, time banks, gift economies, community land
trusts, grocery cooperatives, worker cooperatives, community-supported agriculture,
community-supported kitchens, credit unions, creative commons licensing, housing
cooperatives, childcare cooperatives, renewable energy cooperatives, tool lending libraries,
co-working spaces, and collaborative consumption. ORSI, supra note 1, at 2–3. See also
Scott & Brown, supra note 10, at 562 (providing examples of both “sharing” firms and
practices considered part of the Sharing Economy).
31
As Hobbes noted, “[t]he first cause of [a]bsurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of
[m]ethod; in that they begin not their [r]atiocination from [d]efinitions; that is, from settled
significations of their words: as if they could cast account, without knowing the value of
the numerall words, one, two, and three.” THOMAS HOBBES & W. G. POGSON
SMITH, HOBBES’S LEVIATHAN: REPRINTED FROM THE EDITION OF 1651 35 (1909). Wesley
Hohfeld also explains that
[e]ven if the difficulty related merely to inadequacy and ambiguity of
terminology, its seriousness would nevertheless be worthy of definite
recognition and persistent effort toward improvement; for in any
closely reasoned problem, whether legal or non-legal, chameleon-hued
words are a peril both to clear thought and to lucid expression. As a
matter of fact, however, the above mentioned inadequacy and
ambiguity of terms unfortunately reflect, all too often, corresponding
paucity and confusion as regards actual legal conceptions.
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28–29 (1913-1914).
32
See, e.g., Martin, supra note 1.
33
See, e.g., Lizzie Richardson, Performing the Sharing Economy, 67 GEOFORUM 121
(2015).
34
See, e.g., Cindy Yoonjoung Heo, Sharing Economy and Prospects in Tourism
Research, 58 ANNALS TOURISM RES. 166 (2016).
35
See, e.g., Davide Arcidiacono et al., Sharing What? The ‘Sharing Economy’ in the
Sociological Debate, 66 SOC. REV. 275 (2018).
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management,36 architecture,37 and law.38 As noted, however, no
consensus has emerged on what the Sharing Economy is.39 For example, the Sharing Economy has been defined as (1) a temporary
access between consumers to underutilized physical assets, possibly
for money;40 (2) a group of systems that enable the sharing of underused assets or services, for free or for a fee, between individuals
or organizations;41 and (3) an umbrella concept encompassing several information and communication technologies that endorse the
consumption of goods and services through online platforms.42
Other authors do not provide a specific definition of the Sharing
Economy but single out specific elements they consider foundational to the phenomenon. For example, Lisa Gansky, one of the first
authors to develop the idea of the Sharing Economy, describes it as
the “Mesh.”43 While Gansky does not provide a definition of the
phenomenon, she does offer four characteristics of the “Mesh business”: (1) something that can be shared, (2) the use of advanced web
and mobile data networks, (3) a focus on physical goods, and (4) the
engagement with costumers through social media.44 Similarly, Arun
Sundararajan, who uses the term “Crowd-Based Capitalism,” does
not provide a definition.45 He does, however, propose four
36
See, e.g., Pablo Muñoz & Boyd Cohen, A Compass for Navigating Sharing Economy
Business Models, 61 CAL. MGMT. REV. 114 (2018).
37
See, e.g., Richard Coyne & Tolulope Onabolu, Blockchain for Architects: Challenges
from the Sharing Economy, 21 ARQ: ARCHITECTURAL RES. Q. 369 (2017).
38
See generally, e.g., Lobel, supra note 1.
39
See Valentin Clemens et al., The Sharing Economy Landscape: Structuring Research
from Airbnb to Zipcar, 2020 ACAD. MGMT. PROC. 1, 4 (2020) (explaining, after a
quantitative analysis of 590 articles on the Sharing Economy, that “[t]he wide dispersion
of research fields has enticed researchers to engage in micro-analyses of one specific
business model…within the sharing economy rather than pursuing the development of
higher-level concepts and theories around it. This has led to isolated research streams that
talk about similar phenomena with different languages.”).
40
Koen Frenken & Juliet Schor, Putting the Sharing Economy into Perspective, 23
ENV’T INNOVATION & SOCIETAL TRANSITIONS 3, 5 (2017).
41
Rachel Botsman, The Sharing Economy: Dictionary of Commonly Used Terms,
MEDIUM (Oct. 20, 2015), https://medium.com/@rachelbotsman/the-sharing-economydictionary-of-commonly-used-terms-d1a696691d12 [https://perma.cc/BE2F-Q5UT].
42
Juho Hamari et al., The Sharing Economy: Why People Participate in Collaborative
Consumption, 67 J. ASS’N INFO. SCI. & TECH. 2047, 2047 (2016).
43
GANSKY, supra note 1, at 5.
44
Id. at 16.
45
SUNDARARAJAN, supra note 1.
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characteristics of the phenomenon: (1) “largely market-based,” (2)
“high-impact capital,” (3) “crowd-based ‘networks’” instead of
centralized institutions, and (4) the blurring of lines—whether between personal and professional services, fully employed and casual
labor, independent and dependent contractor, or work and leisure.46
The same approach has been taken by Rachel Botsman and Roo
Rogers who also find four underlying elements.47 They refer to the
phenomenon as “Collaborative Consumption,” and identify it with:
(1) critical mass, (2) idling capacity, (3) belief in the commons, and
(4) trust among strangers.48 Thus, the scholarly ideas on the Sharing
Economy are broad, segmented, and, to a great extent using unrelated terms in the hope of identifying a singular underlying conceptual foundation.49
Legal scholarship on the Sharing Economy is no different. While
not as profuse as the wider business and related literature on the
topic, current legal scholarship also discusses the Sharing Economy
without a commonly accepted definition. Manifold definitions can
be found in the legal scholarship. For instance, Lawrence Lessig,
perhaps the first legal scholar to address the term “Sharing Economy,”50 limits the phenomenon to non-monetary transactions as an
alternative to the “Commercial Economy.”51 In Lessig’s definition,
the term is limited to an economy where access is regulated by a set
of social relations other than money.52 Conversely, Stephen R. Miller refers to the Sharing Economy as an economic model where people create and share goods, services, space, and money.53 Daniel
Rauch and David Schleicher define the Sharing Economy as a dynamic of reduction in transaction costs which permits disaggregated

46

Id. at 27.
BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 75.
48
Id.
49
See Clemens et al., supra note 39, at 5 (claiming that “[t]he research in the field of the
sharing economy is much more phenomenological than theoretical….Thus, most of the
existing studies do not use or provide comprehensive theoretical frameworks….” ).
50
See supra note 10.
51
LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID
ECONOMY 145 (2008).
52
Id.
53
Miller, supra note 8, at 150.
47
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consumption.54 Rauch and Schleicher include two broad categories
under this term: (1) Asset Hubs, companies renting physical assets
directly owned by such firms and (2) Peer-to-Peer Sharing Networks, networks that connect would-be sellers or workers with
would-be buyers or employers.55
By contrast, Vanessa Katz claims that “sharing” platforms are
markets only for peer-to-peer services, rejecting Rauch and Schleicher’s Asset Hub category.56 This difference explains why Katz, for
example, defines the Sharing Economy as a business model where
an online intermediary acts as a market for peer-to-peer services facilitating exchanges by lowering transaction costs,57 whereas others,
such as Lessig, use the term for non-profit activities.58 Finally, also
worth mentioning is Ryan Calo and Alex Rosenblat’s use. They uphold that the “sharing” model is an umbrella term which includes
not only a group of techniques and practices that facilitate transactions among strangers through digital platforms, but also a rhetorical
strategy to attract support while avoiding restriction and regulation.59
Still, other legal scholars see no need to provide a definition of
the term Sharing Economy but simply focus on elements, characteristics, or qualities that they consider are indicative. For example, Sofia Ranchordás claims that “[t]he Sharing Economy presupposes
two elements: the existence of physical ‘shareable goods that systematically have excess capacity,’ and a sharing attitude or motivation.”60 Kellen Zale, in turn, proposes four different characteristics
associated with the Sharing Economy: (1) monetization of assets,
(2) focus on the access to these assets instead on their ownership,
(3) reliance on technology to allow the access to the assets, and (4)
exclusive involvement of individuals rather than businesses in the
54

Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 1, at 912.
Id. at 913–15.
56
Vanessa Katz, Regulating the Sharing Economy, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1067, 1070
(2015).
57
Id. at 1070.
58
LESSIG, supra note 51, at 145.
59
Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information and Power,
117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1625, 1670 (2017).
60
Sofia Ranchordás, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the Sharing
Economy, 16 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 413, 416 (2015).
55
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Sharing Economy transactions.61 Finally, Janelle Orsi asserts that
“[a]lthough it is hard to encapsulate the qualities of this new economy, it generally facilitates community ownership, localized production, sharing, cooperation, small-scale enterprise, and the regeneration of economic and natural abundance.”62 Accordingly, the legal scholarship, like the broader scholarly context, is unclear in its
use of the term and in fact, the underlying concept.
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, there is no common
understanding of the phenomenon. First, there is no unanimous terminology of the phenomenon. It is referred to by a variety of terms,
such as the “Sharing Economy,” “The Mesh,” “Crowd-Based Capitalism,” and “Collaborative Consumption.”63 Further, as the analysis also shows, there is no consensus on the nature of the underlying
phenomenon. While some authors do not define it, others refer to
the phenomenon as an economy, a business model, or a set of techniques and practices. Finally, the analysis shows that there are
no commonly agreed upon characteristics of the phenomenon.
On one end of the spectrum, some authors understand the Sharing
Economy model is essentially for-profit, refers to peer-to-peer (P2P)
activities, deals exclusively with physical assets, and is not concerned about trust. On the other end, differing authors suggest that
the model is not for profit, includes services and organizations in the
transactions (P2B or B2P), and is associated with considerations
about trust. This absence of agreement reflects underlying ambiguity in the concept of the Sharing Economy itself. As legal scholar
Kellen Zale argues: “[t]he debate over the sharing economy thus remains frustrating and controversial in large part because we lack a
doctrinally cohesive and normatively satisfying way of talking about
the underlying activities occurring within the sharing economy.”64

61

Zale, supra note 1, at 527.
ORSI, supra note 1, at 2.
63
See supra note 1 for more examples of denominations of the Sharing Economy.
64
Zale, supra note 1, at 509–10; see also Bryan P. Schwartz & Ellie Einarson, The
Disruptive Force of the Sharing Economy, 18 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 221, 223
(2018) (arguing that the “[d]efinitional ambiguity demonstrates the paradox of the sharing
economy, perceived as both an alternative to the capitalist system and an embodiment of
it.”).
62

1010

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXXI:997

This Article argues that the Sharing Economy model can be best
understood by applying contract and property law. It argues that the
allocation of contractual and property rights and duties form the
heart of the transactions executed in the Sharing Economy model.
For example, the Sharing Economy facilitates an unusual exercise
of property rights by allowing use of private property by the public.
To be properly understood, the extent of that usage must be revisited
from a property law and contract law perspectives—a matter we can
only touch upon in this definitional Article. A combined analysis of
property law and contract law is, then, critical to understanding and
addressing the Sharing Economy.
However, analysis of the Sharing Economy from both property
and contract law perspectives has been largely overlooked. Most of
the legal scholarship has based its analysis on non-legal concepts,
effectively preventing a law-oriented discussion of its conceptual
foundations.65 To fill this gap, next, this Article provides a legally
tailored definition and analysis of the Sharing Economy.
II. LEGAL THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
This part explains the concepts underlying the Sharing Economy
by applying legal frameworks from property and contract law. The
first theoretical foundation is drawn from Tony Honoré’s work.
While Honoré’s focus was on the overall concept of “ownership,”
his analysis provides a framework for analyzing the content and allocation of property rights generally.66 Honoré argues that certain
incidents of ownership must be generally present for a person to be
considered the owner of a thing.67 These “standard incidents of

65

For example, some legal scholars replicate non-legal definitions to discuss the
phenomenon. See Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property in the Sharing Economy,
43 PEPP. L. R. 61, 76 (2015) [hereinafter Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption]; Shelly KreiczerLevy, Share, Own, Access, 36 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 155, 174 (2017) [hereinafter
Kreiczer-Levy, Share]; Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Property Without Personhood, 47 SETON
HALL L. REV. 771, 785 (2017) [hereinafter Kreiczer-Levy, Property].
66
TONY HONORÉ, MAKING LAW BIND: ESSAYS LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL (1987).
67
Id. at 165. Things or property, following Kevin Gray’s theoretical contribution, are
understood as excludable resources for the purposes of this article. See infra p. 1012.
Consequently, the terms thing(s), property and excludable resource(s) are used
interchangeably throughout this article.
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ownership” are defined as “those legal rights, duties, and other incidents which apply, in the ordinary case, to the person who has the
greatest interest in a thing admitted by a mature legal system.”68
Honoré’s standard incidents of ownership, also called the “bundle
of rights,”69 are:70
The right to possess: the right to have exclusive control of the
thing;71
The right to use: the right to enjoy the thing;72
The right to manage: the right to decide how and by whom the
thing will be used;73
The right to the income: the right to the benefits derived from
the thing;74
The right to the capital: the power to alienate the thing and the
liberty to consume, waste or destroy it;75
The right to security: the right to remain owner of the thing indefinitely as long as the owner remains solvent;76

68
HONORÉ, supra note 66, at 161. Honoré contrasts this greatest interest in the thing
with easements, short leases, licenses, special property, and mere detention, which
represent lesser interests. Id. at 175.
69 Technically, Honoré’s standard incidents of ownership together with Wesley Hohfeld’s
scheme of correlatives and opposites jural relations compound the “bundle of rights”
perception of property. See J. E. Penner, The Bundle of Rights Picture of Property, 43
UCLA L. REV. 711, 712 (1996) (explaining that “[i]n its conventional formulation, the
bundle of rights thesis is a combination of Wesley Hohfeld's analysis of rights
and…Honoré's description of the incidents of ownership.”); DUNCAN SHEEHAN, THE
PRINCIPLES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW 4 (2011) (observing that “[t]his idea of the bundle
of rights derives from a combination of Honoré and Hohfeld.”).
70
HONORÉ, supra note 66, at 165.
71
Id. at 166.
72
Id. at 168.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 169.
75
Id. at 170. See also Penner, supra note 69, at 759 (explaining that “[t]he motivation
behind grouping these powers and liberties together seems to be that these involve the
extinction of the relationship between the owner and the thing, either by its transfer or its
destruction.”).
76
See HONORÉ, supra note 66, at 171.
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The incident77 of transmissibility: indefinite transmission of the
owners’ interests to their lawful successors;78
The incident of absence of term: lack of a term limiting the ownership interest;79
The incident of residuarity: meaning that the owner has a residual right to retake the ownership rights previously transferred to the
holders of lesser interests;80
The duty to prevent harm: the duty to prevent the thing from
being used by the owner or by others to harm others;81
The liability to execution: the possibility to lose the ownership
rights as a result of debts.82
In analyzing the legal concept of ownership and the incidents of
ownership, Honoré’s work provides a framework to identify the specific property rights that exist, as well as the substantive content of
these rights. The framework, therefore, identifies the specific incidents of ownership that could be transferred from the owner to a
transferee.83
The second useful analytical framework in property law is offered by Kevin Gray.84 Gray focuses on the “propertisation” of resources or, in other words, the determination of whether a resource
can be held as property.85 Gray claims that a resource can only be
“propertised” if it is excludable.86 A resource is excludable “only if
77
Following Hart’s thought, Honoré refrains from calling this incident a right because,
under his view, the exercise of a right must depend on the choice of the holder, which does
not happen with this particular incident. See id. at 173. This claim can also be applied to
the incidents of absence of term and residuarity. Id.
78
Id. at 172.
79
See id. at 172–73.
80
Id. at 165, 177–79.
81
Id. at 174.
82
See id. at 175.
83
For purposes of this Article, “transfer” is understood as “[a]ny mode of disposing of
or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, including a gift, the payment of money,
release, lease, or creation of a lien or other encumbrance”, and “transaction” is “[a]ny
activity involving two or more persons.” Transaction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019).
84
Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, 50 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 252 (1991).
85
See id. at 256.
86
Id. at 268.
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it is feasible for a legal person to exercise regulatory control over
the access of strangers to the various benefits inherent in the resource.”87 This, according to Gray, can be completed if the resource
is physically, legally, or morally excludable.88 A resource is physically non-excludable when it is not possible to exclude others from
access to the benefits of the resource, like the beam of light coming
from a lighthouse.89 A resource is legally non-excludable when it is
not protected against others by legal means, such as an intellectual
property regime.90 Lastly, resources are morally non-excludable
when they are “perceived to be so central or intrinsic to constructive
human coexistence that it would be severely anti-social that these
resources should be removed from the commons.”91 Human freedoms illustrate this category. Property is, thus, “a power-relation
constituted by legally sanctioned control over access to the benefits
of excludable resources.”92 Therefore, the thesis of “propertisation”
of resources through excludability aids in determining whether a
thing can be deemed property or not. In other words, whether it is a
candidate for the Sharing Economy’s property regime.
The last analytical framework necessary for our analysis of the
Sharing Economy is the foundation of contract law. As legal scholar
Samuel Williston observes, “[t]he requirements for the formation of
a simple contract are: (1) [p]arties of legal capacity; (2) an expression of mutual assent of the parties to a promise, or set of promises,
[and] (3) an agreed valid consideration.”93 Valid consideration in a
87

Id.
Id. at 269.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 273.
91
Id. at 280.
92
Id. at 295.
93
SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 17 (1924). The author explains that
“[c]ontracts which derive their efficacy from the substance of the transaction rather than
its form are called simple contracts.” Id. at 10. See also Rotenberry v. Hooker, 864 So. 2d
266, 270 (Miss. 2003) (explaining that the essential elements for the formation of a valid
contract are: two or more contracting parties with the legal capacity to make a contract,
consideration, mutual assent, an agreement that is sufficiently definite, and no legal
prohibition preventing contract formation); Hanson v. Water Ski Mania Estates, 108 P.3d
481, 485 (Mont. 2005) (stating that “[i]t is well established that the essential elements of a
contract, whether written or oral, are: 1) identifiable parties capable of contracting; 2)
88
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bilateral contract, in turn, makes reference to “[m]utual promises in
each of which the promisor undertakes some act or forbearance
[consideration] that will be, or apparently may be, detrimental to the
promisor or beneficial to the promisee, and neither of which is rendered void by any rule of law other than that relating to consideration. . . .”94 Consequently, following Williston, a binding contract
arises from an agreement between persons with legal capacity who
exchange mutual promises which are favorable to the promisee or
unfavorable to the promisor.95 Next, this Article continues to dissect the Sharing Economy by examining the two component terms,
sharing and economy.
III. LEGAL SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF THE TERM “SHARING
ECONOMY”
To create a definition of “Sharing Economy,” the terms sharing
and economy must be analyzed. This part is divided into three subsections: the first subsection is aimed at the legal analysis of the term
sharing; the second addresses analysis of the term economy; and the
final considers their potential combination in law and draws some
conclusions.
A. Legal Analysis of the Term “Sharing”
The Sharing Economy, as an umbrella concept, includes a range
of different activities, transfers, and practices. For example,

consent of these parties; 3) a lawful object; and 4) sufficient cause or consideration.”);
Perlmuter Printing Co. v. Strome, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 409, 414 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (asserting
that the essential elements of a contract include an offer and acceptance, contractual
capacity, consideration, a manifestation of mutual assent and legality of object and of
consideration).
94
WILLISTON, supra note 93, at 215. See also Finlay v. Swirsky, 103 Conn. 624, 631
(1925) (“A consideration has been defined as a benefit to the party promising, or a loss or
detriment to the party to whom the promise is made.”); Osborne v. Locke Steel Chain Co.,
153 Conn. 527, 531 (1966) (arguing that “[i]n defining the elements of the rule, we have
stated that consideration consists of ‘a benefit to the party promising, or a loss or detriment
to the party to whom the promise is made.’ An exchange of promises is sufficient
consideration to support a contract.” (citation omitted) (quoting Finlay, 103 Conn. at 631));
Perlmuter Printing Co., 436 F. Supp. at 414 (defining consideration as “the bargained for
legal benefit and/or detriment”).
95
WILLISTON, supra note 93, at 17.
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transportation services provided by Uber’s drivers and paid by
Uber’s Users, or lodgment provided by Airbnb’s Providers and paid
for by Airbnb’s Users, are examples of these activities, transfers,
and practices.96
Black’s Law Dictionary provides two definitions of the verb to
share: (1) “[t]o divide (something) into portions” or (2) “[t]o enjoy
or partake of (a power, right, etc.).”97 Three different concepts of the
verb to share can be deduced from these definitions. First, sharing
can be understood as dividing something into portions. In this definition, the verbs to share and to divide are synonymous. The definition applies to cases such as sharing—or dividing—of profits under
a partnership agreement. As the Sharing Economy is understood
today, it cannot be appropriately described as dividing or partitioning a thing.
The second definition refers to sharing as the enjoyment of a
right, power, or other legal category.98 It conceptualizes the verb to
share, perhaps oddly, as an individual behavior rather than a collective one, in that one can “enjoy” a right without the involvement of
others. However, this individual behavior does not describe the
transfers and transactions performed within the Sharing Economy,
which necessarily involve multiple parties. Thus, sharing as enjoyment is not a suitable definition to explain legally the term sharing
within the overall term “Sharing Economy.”
The third definition, sharing as partaking,99 provides a better description of the phenomenon and so is helpful for the analysis. Partake means to “become involved with or take part in something with
other people.”100 In this definition of the term, the verb to share is
understood as being involved with or taking part in a right, power,

96

Note that these activities, transfers, and practices indicate the association of the Sharing
Economy with the verb to share and not the noun share. Because of this, this analysis
focuses on the verb to share instead of the noun share. The noun share, when used to mean
a part of something—as in a share of an estate or shares of a corporation—is not part of
this analysis.
97
Share, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Partake, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, available at https://dictionary.cambridge.org/
dictionary/english/partake [https://perma.cc/XG47-8RVG].
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or something else with another person. For example, when A lends
B a laptop for one day, B becomes involved in the property rights A
holds as the owner of the laptop. Applying this definition to our
property analysis, we see that sharing is properly understood as the
owner of a thing allowing others to be involved or taking part of the
owner’s rights in that thing.
Thus, from a legal perspective, sharing can be defined as the
partial transfer of the standard incidents of ownership––the “bundle
of rights.” Sharing is not about transferring the ownership of the
thing—namely, all the standard incidents of ownership—but the
partial transfer of one or more of the bundle of rights.101 As a result,
sharing, from a property law perspective, is the transfer of some incidents of ownership, such as the right to possess or the right to use,
without transferring the ownership of the thing.102 It is an incomplete or partial transfer of property rights.
The term sharing has another layer. As a verb, the term includes
an action, a transfer element, a mechanism, or a process that allows
parties previously not partaking to participate. This transfer aspect
of the term, as this Article argues, is critical to the definition of the
term “Sharing Economy.” This facet of the word, not found in
Black’s Law Dictionary, draws attention to the absence of consideration in sharing transfers. Sharing transactions do not contain

101

See Kreiczer-Levy, Share, supra note 65, at 156, 188 (arguing that “share” is a type
of access and access is a casual, short-term use of property); Donald J. Kochan, I Share,
Therefore It’s Mine, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 909, 913 (2017) (explaining that “[w]hen I share
property, what is mine does not become yours; it actually remains mine.”).
102
Even though the entitlement of one or more standard incidents of ownership is
required to share, a person is not required to be the owner of the thing—namely, the holder
of all the incidents of ownership—in order to share it. For example, if B is a tenant in A’s
apartment, B is not entitled to the entire bundle of A’s rights but just to some of them—
e.g., the right to possess, the right to use and the right to manage. However, B, exercising
his or her right to manage, can allow a relative (C) to stay in the property while B is overseas
by transferring his or her rights to possess and use the apartment to C. Here, B would have
shared to C the apartment owned by A. This perception is consistent with the legal maxims
nemo dat quod non habet (“no one gives a better title to property than he himself
possesses”) and nemo plus juris ad alienum transferre potest quam ipse haberet (“[n]o one
can transfer to another a greater right than he himself might have”). Share, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)
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mutual promises but are unilateral promises of the owner103 to share
their property. In other words, the owner of the thing makes a gratuitous transfer of certain incidents of ownership i.e. without any
quid pro quo.104 Consequently, no contract is created between the
parties involved in sharing transfers because one of the essential elements for the formation of contracts—consideration—is not present in the transfer.105 A sharing transfer is a nudum pactum106 or
“one-way” agreement that is not legally enforceable as a contract.107
Therefore, in an event properly described as a sharing transfer, only
the owner is making a promise: a gratuitous, partial transfer of his
or her bundle of rights to another person who, without giving anything in exchange, will enjoy such rights.
The doctrine of consideration is crucial in the delineation of the
term “Sharing Economy.” Without this doctrine, businesses which
are radically different seem similar. They will be equally included
under the umbrella concept of the Sharing Economy. The difference

103
Although sharing transactions can also be started by non-owners—see supra note
102—the example of the owner (holder of all incidents of ownership) as the actor who
shares the property is maintained for purposes of clarity.
104
For example, Daniel B. Kelly differentiates sharing and exchange transactions by
explaining that, “[u]nlike sharing, which entails a gratuitous transfer, exchange entails a
transfer with consideration.” This explains why the author mentions gratuitous licenses,
gratuitous easements and gratuitous bailments as examples of sharing transactions. Daniel
B. Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857, 873, 886, 896, 901 (2013). See also
Dave Fagundes, Why Less Property is More: Inclusion, Dispossession, & Subjective WellBeing, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 1380 n.93 (2018) (identifying gratuitous transfers as actual
sharing); Diamond Smith, Renting Diversity: Airbnb as the Modern Form of Housing
Dscrimination, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 581, 585 (2018) (arguing that “[t]he word ‘sharing’ has
positive connotations, evoking thoughts of gratuitous acts towards fellow members of
society.”).
105
See supra p. 1013. See also Stein, supra note 1, at 796 (explaining that the word
“share” connotes “bestowing something without consideration, as when a child shares their
candy with a classmate, where it would be unusual to expect payment.”).
106
See PHILIP CLARKE & JULIE CLARKE, CONTRACT LAW: COMMENTARIES, CASES AND
PERSPECTIVES 114 (2d ed. 2012) (explaining that without consideration, the agreement “is
a nudum pactum and unenforceable as a contract.”); Nudum Pactum, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining a nudum pactum as an “agreement that is
unenforceable as a contract because it is not ‘clothed’ with consideration.”).
107
However, depending on the applicable jurisdiction, unilateral promises may be
enforceable by other means as the inclusion of the promise in a deed (formal contract) or
the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. See CLARKE & CLARKE, supra note
106, at 114–15.
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between these businesses is simply the contractual doctrine of consideration. For example, both Airbnb108 and CouchSurfing109 are
platforms aimed to provide lodging to the public. While the former
offers accommodation to people in exchange for money, the latter
offers accommodation to people for free.110 This difference is important because the legal relationship between the parties on the
Airbnb platform is markedly different from the legal relationship
between the same parties if they were to use the CouchSurfing platform. Airbnb arrangements include consideration and as a result,
there is a binding contract between such parties with all the rights
and duties that entails.111 However, by using the CouchSurfing
platform the opposite is true: namely, there is no consideration
and, therefore, there is no contract and no binding obligations on
any of the parties.112 Thus, unlike contracts, sharing transactions do
not contain mutual promises but are solely the unilateral promises
of the owner.
Hence, the verb to share—or sharing—can be defined from a
legal perspective as the gratuitous transfer of one or more—but not
all—property rights a person has in respect of a thing—an excludable resource.113 Sharing occurs when a non-owner partakes of the
owner’s property rights in the owner’s resource. This occurs when
the owner transfers one or more—but not all—of the bundle of rights
108

See How Airbnb Works, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com.au/d/howairbnbworks
[https://perma.cc/8F4P-7EYD].
109
See About Us, COUCHSURFING, https://about.couchsurfing.com/about/about-us/
[https://perma.cc/2YJH-S8A6].
110
Compare Payments, Pricing, and Refunds, AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com.au/help/topic/1359/payments-pricing-and-refunds [https://perma.
cc/ZZ4A-9B9F] with Frequently Asked Questions, COUCHSURFING, https://about.couch
surfing.com/about/faq/ [https://perma.cc/2YJH-S8A6].
111
See Terms of Service, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com.au/help/article/2908/termsof-service [https://perma.cc/W6UF-U7W3].
112
See COUCHSURFING, supra note 109.
113
Kelly illustrates that “[s]haring enables donative transfers without requiring the
transfer of ownership….” Kelly, supra note 104, at 877. Also, Donald J. Kochan explains
that “[s]haring occurs when an owner-sharer grants a nonowner-sharee permission to use,
possess, or access sharer’s property without transferring an ownership interest and without
an ex ante legal obligation to so share.…‘Sharing,’ as the term is usually used in recent
literature, is a special brand of permission; the retained ownership interest and the right of
revocability distinguishes ‘sharing’ from these other types of relationships.” Kochan, supra
note 101, at 945, 947.
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to the non-owner for free––partial transfer.114 As Kochan, states:
“[t]he sharee is merely partaking in a privileged use of the property
as a result of the sharer’s choice.”115 This definition provides a
strong demarcation of activities which can rightly be categorized as
sharing and those which cannot. Only a partial, gratuitous transfer
can be correctly categorized as sharing. All else is excluded.
B. Legal Analysis of the Term “Economy”
Black’s Law Dictionary defines economy as (1) “[t]he management or administration of the wealth and resources of a community
(such as a city, state, or country)”, (2) “[t]he sociopolitical organization of a community’s wealth and resources”, and (3) the
“[r]estrained, thrifty, or sparing use of resources; efficiency.”116
From a legal standpoint, therefore, the term economy is focused
on the organization and use of the wealth and resources of a community.117 It encompasses any kind of transfer that facilitates a community’s management of its wealth, whether consideration-based
transactions or sharing-based transfers. A community may consider
sharing as an appropriate form of managing, organizing, or efficiently using its wealth and resources. Accordingly, the use of the
term “economy” as part of the overall term “Sharing Economy”
could be considered appropriate if it is being used to denote gratuitous partial transfers allowing communities to efficiently manage
their resources.
This initial analysis, however, is incomplete as it does not encompass all activities commonly cast under the umbrella of the
“Sharing Economy,” nor does it effectively delineate or describe

114

Transactions that suppose a total transfer of the bundle of rights, thus, should not be
considered sharing transactions from a property law perspective even if they take the legal
form of granting co-ownership. See Kochan, supra note 101, at 939 (contrasting sharing—
as a time- or purpose-limited inclusion—with the transfer of ownership). According to the
author, in “sharing” circumstances, “ownership remains with the sharer. If an individual
simply sells her property to another or transfers part of her ownership interests, she may be
giving someone an ‘ownership share’ in the property, but she is not engaging in
‘sharing’.…The sharee is simply consuming resources in an access-related, rather than
ownership-related, capacity.” Id.
115
Id. at 944.
116
Economy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
117
See id.
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adequately apparently similar activities. To achieve this outcome,
we must carefully consider varying types of transactions which incorrectly apply the term “Sharing Economy.”
This Article has argued that there are two characteristics which
are necessary in order for an action to properly fall into the category
sharing: (1) a partial transfer of property rights in a resource and (2)
a gratuitous transfer. Yet, many parties include paid transfers and
services when using the term “Sharing Economy.”118 Next, this Article will argue that these are incorrectly included in the concept of
the Sharing Economy.
Using this set of binaries—complete versus incomplete property
transfers and gratuitous versus paid transactions—we can distinguish four different types of economies. Based on the property and
contract law analysis above, we propose the Economies Matrix below (See Figure 1). In this matrix, the left- and right-hand sides—
the contractual element—represent the existence or non-existence
of consideration and, therefore, the creation or not of a contract. The
upper and lower division of the matrix denotes the transfer of the
total bundle of rights or less—the property element.

118

See supra Part I.
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Economies Matrix (Figure 1)

As is evident from the diagram, this legal taxonomy of economies creates four categories. The top part of the matrix contains only
those categories of transactions that comprise a complete transfer of
the bundle of rights or provide a service. More particularly, these
transactions must include Honoré’s right to the capital, right to security, incident of transmissibility, incident of absence of term, and
incident of “residuarity,”119 or must provide a service.
With respect to the lower half of the matrix, only those transactions that do not purport to transfer the same set of rights and incidents are included. It represents partial transfers of the bundle of
rights. In other words, the Access Economy and Sharing Economy
preclude the transfer of Honoré’s right to the capital, right to security, incident of transmissibility, incident of absence of term, and
incident of “residuarity.”
Turning to the contractual division, the left-hand side of the matrix contains those transactions that are consideration-based and,
therefore, create a contract. Conversely, the right-hand side of the
matrix incorporates transactions that do not create a contract because they lack consideration.

119

See supra p. 1011.
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Next, we discuss the matrix categories individually. Note that
these categories can be widely applied to transactions across different platforms. As our analysis is focused on the behavior facilitated
by internet-based platforms, we use examples of activities which
have been included—often incorrectly—under the umbrella term
“Sharing Economy” and are platform based.
The most common and widely understood category of transactions is the Exchange Economy, which is represented on the upper
left of the matrix. It is characterized by the exchange of goods and
services, either for money or other consideration. As previously
stated, “exchange entails a transfer with consideration.”120 Exchanges are not gratuitous transactions. Rather, these transactions
are bound by contracts, transfers for value. In our classification matrix, the category is limited to contract-based transfers which include
the full bundle of rights. It also captures transactions for services.
Thus, this category includes transactions currently, but incorrectly,
associated with the “Sharing Economy.” Examples include transactions made via TradeMade121 and Letgo,122 as well as Uber and other
so-called ride-sharing services.
The second category, termed the Gift Economy and on the upper
right of the matrix, excludes those transactions which require consideration and only includes those gratuitous transactions either for
services or for the transfer of the entire bundle of property rights.123
For example, donations on sites such as Ziilch, Leftoverswap, and
120

See Kelly, supra note 104, at 873.
TradeMade is an online platform that allows people to trade items. See Our
Mission, Our Story, TRADEMADE, http://www.trademade-app.com/the-mission/
[https://perma.cc/M4B6-V2HJ].
122
Letgo is an online platform for buying and selling second-hand goods. See Who We
Are, LETGO, https://we.letgo.com/ [https://perma.cc/4LGD-YQTP].
123
See Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (explaining that “gifts” suppose
the transfer of property and arise from detached and disinterested generosity, not from a
moral or legal obligation or as a payment in return for services rendered); see also RICHARD
HYLAND, GIFTS: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LAW 135–36, 148, 171, 197 (2009) (proposing
four definitional elements of the gift: (1) gratuitousness, which in the Common Law legal
system “involves a transaction without a valid legal consideration”; (2) a subjective
element, which in the Common Law tradition refers to the donative intent; (3) an inter
vivos transfer, which refer to “gratuitous transfers that take place during the donor’s
lifetime”; and (4) the gift object, which in the Common Law system is not restricted to a
particular type of property).
121
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Freecycle fall into this category.124 Again, although some parties include these transactions within the umbrella concept of the “Sharing
Economy,” we have demonstrated they are not.
The third category, termed the Access Economy and placed on
the lower left, includes only those transactions that require both consideration and involve a partial transfer of property rights.125 Examples of this type of transactions, where access to property is paid for,
include Airbnb, RentMyWardrobe, and Getaround. These transactions will be misclassified if they are linked to the Sharing Economy—a common error.
Finally, the fourth category on the lower right, Sharing Economy, is limited to those transfers bereft of consideration and which
transfer only some but not all of the property rights.126 This latter
category is the only true category properly denominated “Sharing
Economy.” The most well-known example is CouchSurfing, but
there are other examples such as TrustRoots and Bewelcome.127
Every transfer and transaction commonly labelled “Sharing
Economy”, therefore, can be included in the four categories of our
matrix of economies differentiated by the doctrine of consideration
and the legal concept of ownership (bundle of rights). The Exchange
and Gift Economies include a grant of title––the bundle of rights in
totum. By way of contrast, with the Access Economy and the Sharing
Economy, the owner maintains the ultimate legal title of the resource, thus the transfer of property rights is only partial. Regarding
124

In fact, this category is perhaps the foundation for the whole concept of the “Sharing
Economy.” Early forays into the use of the internet for the sharing and dissemination of
goods and services created great disruption and set precedents for how legal rights would
develop and business models could be created. These early sites and services included free
services such as Napster, Linux, and Wikipedia.
125
See Zale, supra note 1, at 533 (defining access as temporary possession or use of
property); see also Kochan, supra note 101, at 939 (contrasting access—as a time-or
purpose-limited inclusion—with the transfer of ownership); see, e.g., Kreiczer-Levy,
Share, supra note 65, at 160 (“In typical access transactions, owners allow short-term use
of their car, bike, drill, or ladder to non-owners in exchange for monetary compensation.”).
126
Lawrence Lessig, therefore, was right when, in 2008, he limited the ‘Sharing
Economy’ to non-monetary transactions. See supra p. 1007.
127
TrustRoots and BeWelcome are online platforms with the same purpose of
CouchSurfing: to connect people who offer free accommodation with people who need it.
https://www.trustroots.org/ [https://perma.cc/96VB-48V3];
See
TRUSTROOTS,
BEWELCOME, https://www.bewelcome.org/ [https://perma.cc/TU9T-C374].
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the contractual element, the Exchange Economy and the Access
Economy both require consideration, relying on a contract. Conversely, the Gift Economy and the Sharing Economy both suppose
the absence of consideration, hence the absence of contract.128
Two final observations with respect to the Access Economy and
Sharing Economy are necessary. First, in situations where the transaction is for the provision of services rather than the provision of
goods, there can be no analysis of property rights. These transactions
involve rights in personam rather than rights in rem.129 Therefore,
transactions related to the provision of services will always be positioned within either the Exchange Economy (when consideration is
present) or the Gift Economy (when consideration is missing). These
are simply contracts for service.
Second, when non-individualized fungible choses in possession—that is to say, interchangeable goods130—are the subject of the
transaction, that transaction can only be positioned within the
Exchange or the Gift Economies. The transfer of these types of
goods is premised upon their consumption and so entails the transmission of the whole bundle of rights (ownership) because the transferor does not expect to receive the same thing in return.
Rather, the transferor expects the return of an equivalent in terms of
quantity and quality to replace that which has been consumed.131

128

See Penner, supra note 69, at 753 (explaining that sharing and giving are uses within
the right to property that gratuitously benefit others); ORSI, supra note 1, at 97 (“[I]t’s
important to acknowledge here that the things we provide for one another in the spirit of
generosity, nurturing, or gift economy are ultimately enforced by social expectation, not
by legal contract.”); see also LESSIG, supra note 51, at 119 (“Money in the sharing economy
is not just inappropriate; it is poisonous.”).
129
See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning 26 YALE L. J. 710, 718 (1916-1917).
130
See SHEEHAN, supra note 69, at 28 (arguing that “fungibility is usually defined in
terms of physical interchangeability—in other words it physically does not matter whether
the claimant has one ton of barley, or oil rather than a different ton of the same substance
from the given bulk.”); F. H. LAWSON & BERNARD RUDDEN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 25 (2d
ed. 1982) (explaining that “goods which are normally fungible can be treated as
individuals. Thus coins, if valued for their rareness or their aesthetic or archaeological
interest, are not fungible, because they cannot be replaced by others.”).
131
See LAWSON & RUDDEN, supra note 130, at 25 (arguing that fungible goods “can be
replaced by equal quantities and qualities, and are estimated by weight, number, or
measure.”).
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It creates and relies on rights in personam rather than rights in
rem.132 Transactions dealing with non-individualized fungible
choses in possession, thus, will always be positioned within either
the Exchange Economy (when consideration is present) or the Gift
Economy (when consideration is absent).
C. Summary
The foregoing analysis makes it clear that the common element
in these activities—the new platform-based behaviors and practices
rapidly spreading around the globe—is not sharing. Rather, the
commonality among them all is the platform underlying the interactions, transfers, and transactions among individuals, groups of people, and businesses for a range of purposes.
In our analysis we have identified the distinct features of four
types of activities facilitated by Platform Operatorss in terms of contract and property law, and we have created distinct categories for
their analysis. For example, well-known Platform Operators can be
readily located in the Exchange Economy (e.g., Uber), Gift Economy
(e.g., Zilch), Access Economy (e.g., Airbnb), or Sharing Economy
(e.g., CouchSurfing). The taxonomy, thus, helps understand that
what has mistakenly been grouped together under the umbrella term
“Sharing Economy” is better understood as a collection of platformbased transactions.
Further, these platform-based transactions do not form a singular
type of economy. Rather, they can be categorized as falling into one
of four well-understood economies. The taxonomy thus helps illustrate that the apparent commonality of these activities is more superficial than actual. Rather, what causes them to be grouped together is the use of the platform technology that allows disaggregated resources to be aggregated and distributed through market or
132

“An example may help. If I borrow $20 from you and promise to repay it, I owe you
$20. You do not expect to get the same $20 note back. Instead, I have a personal obligation
to pay which corresponds to your personal right to be paid $20. This is a right in personam
which can be enforced against me, regardless of what has become of the $20 note I
borrowed . . . . In contrast, if I borrow your book and promise to return it, you continue to
own the book. In addition to my promise, you have a right in rem which is enforceable
against me because I have your book.” ROBERT CHAMBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
PROPERTY LAW IN AUSTRALIA 7 (3d ed. 2013).
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quasi-market type institutional arrangements, creating a new business model.
Three main conclusions are drawn from this Part. First, a range
of different transactions are commonly and mistakenly lumped together in the term “Sharing Economy.” These transactions neither
exclusively nor necessarily involve sharing.133 Second, the issue is
not one of economies per se. Rather, it is about the use of platform
technology and the creation of a new legal structure. The common
denominator of these transactions is the PUP model, not the economy where it takes place. Finally, the term “Sharing Economy” is
therefore incorrect and misleading to denominate all new platformbased transactions.134 Next, this Article examines the PUP model
in detail.

133
See Scott & Brown, supra note 10, at 570 (concluding the following as regards the
“sharing” companies Zipcar, Etsy, and WeWork: “Put simply, there is no ‘sharing’ in the
millions of transactions that take place on these and many other so-called ‘sharing’
platforms.”); John Infranca, Intermediary Institutions and the Sharing Economy, 90 TUL.
L. REV. ONLINE 29, 30 (2016) (contending that “[i]t has become a well-worn truism that
little, if any, actual sharing occurs in the ‘sharing economy.’”).
134
See Stemler, supra note 24, at 207 (arguing that “[d]espite the common perception,
the term ‘Sharing Economy’ is clearly a misnomer . . . dominant companies within the
Sharing Economy (Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, etc.) rarely enable sharing as it is commonly
understood.”); Scott & Brown, supra note 10, at 556 (contending that “[a]nother risk to
consumers concerns the mistaken assumption that sharing economy companies always
benefit society. Because members of the original sharing economy often touted a social
and environmental mission, new sharing economy companies may benefit unjustly from a
misperception that they are socially beneficial. Just as firms once engaged in
‘greenwashing,’ some have suggested that organizations now engage in ‘sharewashing’–
claiming illusory benefits related to the sharing concept.”); Zale, supra note 1, at 525
(explaining that “[l]abels are powerful agenda setters, and the intuitively positive
connotations of the word ‘sharing’ may not make it the most objective moniker.”); see
Schwartz & Einarson, supra note 64, at 223 (observing that “[o]ther academics are wary
of the use of the word ‘sharing,’ since activities in the sharing economy are an economic
exchange not unlike commercial relationships. Given that the sharing economy is anchored
firmly in free market principles, financial gain and transactions motivated by self-interest,
‘sharing’ may be a misnomer.”); see also Stein, supra note 1, at 801 (“The term ‘sharing’
is deceptive in one sense, for the so-called sharing economy is an anti-sharing economy in
some ways . . . .”).
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IV. PUP MODEL: PLATFORM OPERATOR-USER-PROVIDER
As noted, this Article argues that the critical change in economy
arises from technological innovation—the development of the PUP
model. We noted that the PUP model creates a much wider network
of interactivity providing an opportunity for people to meet their
needs and put inactive assets or time into economic productivity.
It achieves this by aggregating and marketing the previously disaggregated resources to a greater audience. This new technology
creates opportunities in all four distinct parts of the economy: in the
for-profit Exchange and Access Economies, and in the non-profit
Sharing and Gift Economies.
Crucially, from a legal standpoint, the PUP model inserts an intermediary, a third party into what were previously private, personally based one-on-one transactions and interactions, some of which
were gratuitous while others were for profit. From an economic
point of view, in some instances, the technological innovation has
fundamentally altered the nature of transfers or services and has
changed the viability of the activity from a one-off or mode of additional income to a main source of income, particularly in the platforms through which Providers supply services, such as Uber, Lyft,
and TaskRabbit.
What is particularly significant for purposes of our analysis are
the implications of the for-profit Platform Operators, notably, those
that do not belong to the true Sharing Economy. These Platform Operators, such as Uber, Airbnb, and TaskRabbit, while seeking the
rhetorical shelter of the term “Sharing Economy,” are in fact distinct
forms of businesses, creating new types of legal relations, or at least
creating doubt about the applicability of existing legal categories. In
the next Part, we analyze this for-profit model in greater detail using
the prior contract and property analysis as set out in the matrix of
economies above.
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A. Defining Elements of the PUP Model
From a legal perspective, the PUP model has two defining properties or elements. First, it has a triangular legal structure135 which
involves three actors (See Figure 2): (1) a Platform Operator which
using technology provides aggregation and interactivity to create a
legal environment by setting the terms and conditions for all the actors; (2) a User who consumes the good or service on the terms and
conditions set by the Platform Operator; and (3) a Provider who provides a good or service also abiding by the Platform Operator’s
terms and conditions.136
Figure 2

Platform

Provider

User

It is important to note that each of the bi-directional arrows represents legal relationships. They indicate rights of contract or transfer of property rights among the parties. Additionally, the three actors are not qualified, namely, they can be any type of person, such

135

Understanding “structure” as “[a]ny construction, production, or piece of work
artificially built up or composed of parts purposefully joined together. . . .” Structure,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
136
Platform Operators, thus, are not providers of the goods and services under the PUP
model. See Lobel, supra note 1, at 100 (arguing that “[platform] companies are not selling
the thing itself: the service, the product, the content. Rather, they are selling access to the
software, the matching algorithms, and a digital system of reputation and trust between
their users.”). This explains why bilateral structures—such as Netflix, where streaming
services are provided directly to consumers; CapitalBikeShare, where the company is the
owner of the bikes offered to the public; and Affirm, where direct loans are directly
disbursed by the firm—are not part of the PUP model. Id.
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as a business entity (artificial or legal person) or an individual (human or natural person).
The second element of the PUP model concerns the active role
of Platform Operators. Platform Operators are at the core of the
structure because they operate the technological platform137 for
transactions to occur by both aggregating information and, in many
instances, supplying ancillary services, such as facilitating payments
required to engage in the provision and consumption of goods and
services. Platform Operators administer the technology which creates the environment in which the actors operate and upon which the
whole model is founded.138 This critical role allows Platform Operators to dictate the terms and conditions of the legal arrangements

137
See Hamari et al., supra note 42, at 2050 (explaining that this phenomenon “operates
through technological platforms, such as a website or mobile app. . . .”). This technological
platform provided by the Platform Operator is enhanced by and dependent on “the modern
power afforded by cloud computing, algorithmic matching, pervasive wireless Internet
access, scaled user-networks, and near-universal customer ownership of smartphones and
tablets.” See Lobel, supra note 1, at 94. According to Teresa Rodríguez-de-las-Heras,
“[e]lectronic platforms are self-regulated communities managed by a platform operator.
Despite that some functions can be designed and implemented to operate on a decentralized
basis . . . electronic platforms are essentially centralized structures.” Teresa Rodríguez-delas-Heras, Rules for Electronic Platforms: The Role of Platforms and Intermediaries in
Digital Economy, a Case for Harmonization, in MODERNIZING INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW TO SUPPORT INNOVATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT – PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 146, 149
(United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 2017).
138
As part of the 2017 Congress of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law, Rodríguez-de-las-Heras explained:
Electronic platforms, in all their variants (e-marketplaces, sharing-based
platforms, business communities, social networks, crowdfunding platforms)
are and operate as closed electronic environments. . . . The difference between
an open environment and a closed one is essentially based on a legal
factor…the closing of an environment is achieved by the use of a contractual
infrastructure that create a contract-based trustworthy context for the users,
self-contained, self-regulated, and, to the maximum possible extent,
independent from domestic jurisdictions. Hence, an electronic platform, as a
closed environment, is built by a set of agreements between the operator and
the users’ community. In absence of specific legal rules, obligations and rights
of platform operators are laid down by the contract terms between the operator
and every user, and, consequently, the role to be actually performed by
operators is devised by the set of contracts supporting the platform.
Rodríguez-de-las-Heras, supra note 137, at 148–49.
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and control the rights, powers, and duties of Providers and Users.139
As a result, Platform Operators unilaterally create an internal legal
environment in which parties engage.140 In sum, the second element
of the PUP model is the active role Platform Operators play: (1) in
creating and operating the technological and legal environments, (2)
creating and facilitating binding agreements with terms and conditions that are strongly skewed in their favor, and (3) providing ancillary services.
B. Types of PUP Models: The P-PUP Model
As noted above, the PUP model can be either for-profit—profitdriven PUP which we denominate “P-PUP”—or non-profit—which
we denominate “N-PUP.”141 The operation of the P-PUP model depends on the profits of both the Platform Operator and the Provider.
Conversely, the operation of the N-PUP model is not underpinned
by profit.
The P-PUP model presupposes that the transactions between
Providers and Users are contract-based. That is, transactions that
139

See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Economy as an
Alternative Capitalist System, 90 TUL. L. REV. 241, 254 (2015) (explaining that individuals
rely on the Platform Operator “to advertise their products, connect them to potential
customers, establish a contractual relationship, and facilitate payment.”); see also Stemler,
supra note 2, at 39 (pointing out the importance of technology in regulating behavior
through lex informatica. “Lex informatica is the concept involving the use of technological
architectures to require or prohibit certain user interactions.”); see also Calo & Rosenblat,
supra note 59, at 1652 (explaining that Platform Operators “design each participant’s entire
digital experience from scratch. They build and update the apps or website portals that
service providers and service users access. They structure the business model and
acceptable forms of transaction. And they write the terms of service and privacy policies
that every participant clicks through in order to use each service.”).
140
Some authors have criticized the power Platform Operators have under this structure.
See, e.g., Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 59, at 1650, 1653, 1661 (arguing Platform
Operators create digital market manipulation, take advantage of their access to Providers
and Users to influence stakeholders such as potential regulators, and hide information about
the marketplace); Dyal-Chand, supra note 139, at 248, 292–93 (contending that big
Platform Operators such as Uber, Airbnb, and TaskRabbit (1) “have a great deal of power
vis-à-vis the service providers . . . . These power imbalances inhibit worker participation
and contribute to rent-seeking by the platform providers”, and (2) “have been able to
develop a new model for doing business that takes advantage of collaboration without
accepting all the associated costs. One such cost is that these companies have to share more
power and responsibility with the businesses involved in their networks.”).
141 See supra p. 1027.
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form part of the P-PUP model are supported by consideration. The
existence of the consideration requirement is, then, a conditio sine
qua non142 of the P-PUP model.
Therefore, based on our Economies Matrix, the P-PUP model
can only be located within the Exchange or Access Economies. The
lack of consideration characterizing the transactions within the Gift
and Sharing Economies excludes the P-PUP model in these economies. N-PUP models, thus, can only be located within the Gift and
Sharing Economies (See Figure 3).
Figure 3

However, the P-PUP model needs to be distinguished further.
This is because there are significantly different business models involved. This differentiation helps particularize subclasses of P-PUP
142

See Conditio sine qua non, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining
conditio sine qua non or sine qua non as “[a]n indispensable condition or thing; something
on which something else necessarily depends.”).
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models that, ultimately, provide the defining characteristics of legal
structures such as the ones utilized by Uber, Airbnb, and TaskRabbit—erroneously touted as “Sharing Economy” businesses. We are
particularly interested in these types of businesses because they have
caused some of the greatest disruptions in the legal environment. By
identifying the specific legal characteristics of this subclass of PPUP model, this Article aims to provide a more accurate legal and
conceptual analysis facilitating appropriate regulation for these
businesses, that to date has tended to be elusive and ambiguous in
terms of its legal nature.
C. The TMP-PUP Model
The P-PUP model can be further subclassified based on timelimited partial transfers, time-limited service provisions, and the accepted forms of consideration. For purposes of this Article, the PPUP models that are time-limited and that only accept monetary
consideration are denominated “TMP-PUPs” (Time-limited, Monetary-consideration-based, Profit-driven PUP models). They are focused solely on time limited transactions—i.e., partial transfers of
property rights, or time limited provision of services—and only accept consideration in monetary form. It is these businesses that have
caused some of the greatest disruptions and are accordingly of greatest concern. The TMP-PUP model is the legal structure adopted
by Platform Operators such as Uber, Airbnb, and TaskRabbit.
It does not operate in the Sharing Economy nor in the Gift Economy.
It exists only within the Exchange and Access Economies.
Therefore, the defining properties of the TMP-PUP model are
the following:
First, the TMP-PUP model, like the PUP model, is a triangular
legal structure composed of a Platform Operator, a Provider, and a
User as its foundation.143 We further refine the TMP-PUP model,
143

See Naomi B. Sunshine, Employees as Price-Takers, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 105,
111 (2018) (arguing that “[w]ork in the gig economy is also characterized by a triangular
relationship. A company or platform links consumers seeking a product or service to a
worker who can provide it.”); Marina Lao, Workers in the Gig Economy: The Case for
Extending the Antitrust Labor Exemption 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1543, 1545 (2018)
(arguing that in the Sharing Economy, workers “provide services in a triangular
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noting that (1) Platform Operators are not providers of the goods and
services that Users seek and consume;144 (2) the triangular legal
structure is comprised of three different legal relationships that may
indicate rights of contract or transfer of property rights among the
three parties;145 and (3) the three legal actors—Platform Operators,
Providers, and Users—can be composed of any type of person, natural or artificial.146

relationship where an online platform serves as an intermediary linking the workers to
potential customers.”); Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 1, at 917 (explaining that “sharing
platforms create and serve ‘two-sided’ markets: their users include both market-buyers and
market-sellers. Examples include Uber, which serves drivers and riders; Airbnb, which
serves homeowners and renters; and DogVacay, which serves pet-owners and petsitters.”).
144
See supra note 136. See also Gannon v. Airbnb Inc., 295 So. 3d 779, 783–84 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that Airbnb and other similar companies are simply conduits
of the rental transaction and do not have any possessory interests in the properties rented
through the platform); Katz, supra note 56, at 1071 (explaining that “unlike websites that
act as online storefronts, sharing platforms are not direct service providers.”); Dyal-Chand,
supra note 139, at 265 (identifying Providers as tiny businesses that act as suppliers).
145
See supra p. 1028. See also Ill. Transport. Trade Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 839 F.3d
594, 598 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining that one of the major differences between the model
adopted by Uber and the model adopted by taxi companies is that Users ‘must sign up with
Uber before being able to summon it, and the sign up creates a contractual relationship
specifying such terms as fares, driver qualifications, insurance, and any special need of the
potential customer owing to his or her having a disability.’); Newark Cab Ass’n v. City of
Newark, 235 F. Supp. 3d 638, 646 (D.N.J. 2017) (explaining that in the TMP-PUP model,
unlike the taxicab model, Platform Operators have a pre-existing contractual relationship
with Users).
146
Allowing legal entities to enter into the TMP-PUP model as Providers or Users is,
ultimately, a business decision. For example, nowadays Uber has two different lines of
business targeted to legal entities qua Users: Uber for Business and Uber Freight. See
https://www.uber.com/au/en/ [https://perma.cc/WQC5-EGXG].
Similarly,
UBER,
Parkhound allows the rental of parking spaces not only by residents but also by businesses.
Under this TMP-PUP, thus, Providers can be both natural persons and legal entities. See
https://www.parkhound.com.au/how-it-works
How
It
Works,
PARKHOUND,
[https://perma.cc/G44M-C7PV]. See also Terms, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com.au/
terms [https://perma.cc/YFS4-J8HM] (establishing the following in section 17 of the
Terms of Service: “You must register an account to access and use many features of the
Airbnb Platform. Registration is only permitted for legal entities, partnerships and natural
persons who are 18 years or older.”). Regarding Platform Operators, positive law and legal
scholarship have recognized the possibility that these actors can be constituted by a natural
person. See, e.g., Road Transport (Public Passenger Services) Act 2001 (ACT) s 28
(Austl.) (providing that any ‘person’, including corporations and individuals, can act as a
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Second, in the TMP-PUP model, the Platform Operator has an
active role. Like the general PUP model,147 in the TMP-PUP model
Platform Operators facilitate the connection between Providers and
Users through a platform,148 aggregate information, and usually supply ancillary services such as payment collection, processing services, and customer support.149 Additionally, Platform Operators

Platform Operator, called Transportation Booking Services in this Act). Further, according
to Rodríguez-de-las-Heras:
Rarely, the operator is an individual (sole trader) or natural person. More
usually, the operator adopts any of the organizational forms, available in the
jurisdiction where it is located, to run a business (corporations, incorporate
joint-ventures, private companies, but also associations, cooperatives, or
partnerships). Interestingly, those organizational forms entailing a distinct and
separate legal personality are preferred. Likewise, commercial companies and
corporations are the most widespread option.’
Rodríguez-de-las-Heras, supra note 137, at 149.
147
See supra p. 1029.
148
See Dyal-Chand, supra note 139, at 248 (explaining that “[i]n the sharing economy,
the key institutions that accomplish sharing are technological platforms that allow networks
of individuals to connect with stable supplies of customers.”); Zale, supra note 1, at 537
(contending that technology “has made it possible for two people – typically strangers – to
engage in sharing activities that had previously taken place primarily in close-knit
communities.”); Katz, supra note 56, at 1070 (explaining that “most sharing platforms
operate through either a web portal or a mobile application (‘app’).”).
149
Platform Operators can be involved in other types of ancillary services such as user
information verification, local tax collection and remittance, dispute resolution, pricing
services, and purchasing of insurance coverage. E.g., Kaseris v Rasier Pacific VOF [2017]
FWC 6610 para 51–50(d) (Austl.) (explaining that Mr. Kaseris, the applicant and Uber
driver, was charged a service fee by Uber for services including lead-generation services,
payment collection and processing services and support services); Robert L. Redfearn,
Sharing Economy Misclassification Employees and Independent Contractors in
Transportation Network Companies 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 2013, 1027 (2016)
(explaining that Uber controls a great part of the ride transaction by (1) vetting the persons
that apply to be Uber drivers, (2) setting fare rates based on its own formulas, (3) taking a
cut of the total fare paid to the driver, and (4) monitoring drivers data). In this regard,
Rodríguez-de-las-Heras explains:
In managing the platform, the operator provides added-value services, adopts
rules, monitors compliance, and penalizes infringements of internal rules by
users. In sum, the operator acts as a service provider, a (contractual) regulator,
and a (contractual) supervisor. Whereas the provision of services (payment
management, insurance, inspection, rating, marketing) has a visible
commercial impact, increasing the appeal of the offer in the market, fostering
loyalty of users, and providing additional financial support; the tasks of
regulating and supervising are key for the creation and preservation of trust.
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unilaterally dictate the internal legal environment of the model.150
They create a legal system which stipulates the rights and duties for
the contractual parties up to and including procedures for dispute
resolution and their ultimate determination.151 Consequently, Platform Operators create the internal legal environment in which the
three legal relationships comprising the triangular legal structure are
created, developed, and terminated.
Third, and specifically like the P-PUP model, the TMP-PUP
model is a profit-driven model.152 The TMP-PUP model is designed for the profit of both the Platform Operator and the Provider.153 Fourth, again as in the P-PUP model, in the TMP-PUP the
goods and services are provided exclusively on a contract-basis.154

Rodríguez-de-las-Heras, supra note 137, at 149. See also Dyal-Chand, supra note 139, at
258 (arguing that, “[o]n the supply side, one thing that makes these markets revolutionary
is the outsourced sharing of key business functions by the individuals and tiny businesses
involved in networks for peer-to-peer rentals, financing, and sales. . . .”).
150
See supra notes 138, 139 and accompanying text. See also Loewenstein, supra note
1, at 1010 (mentioning that “Uber, for instance, uses a sophisticated mobile app to connect
drivers to fare-paying customers (or riders). The company leverages this technology by
structuring its legal relationship with the drivers. . . .”); Katz, supra note 56, at 1071
(identifying the degree of control of the Platform Operator as a critical distinction between
this actor and other online services. According to Katz, “[s]haring platforms exercise
control over transactions by directing the form and content of listings, issuing minimum
quality standards for providers, providing an electronic payment system, and charging a
transaction fee for each exchange.”).
151 Id.
152
See Stemler, supra note 24, 222 (arguing that “the Sharing Economy is motivated by
profit, not altruism.”); see also Agnieszka A. McPeak, Sharing Tort Liability in the New
Sharing Economy, 49 CONN. L. REV. 171, 178 (2016) (arguing that “the new sharing
economy is largely driven by the for-profit motives of behemoth companies.”).
153
See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 1133, 1145 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (noting
that “Uber derives profits from providing transportation services. . . .”); Calo & Rosenblat,
supra note 59, at 1652 (arguing that this phenomenon has a simple business model: “It
connects consumers to providers for a fee.”); Zale, supra note 1, at 528, 565 n. 240
(explaining that individuals providing services through this phenomenon offer their labor
and time in exchange for a fee, and identifying that “Airbnb, Uber, and Munchery, like
many other sharing economy companies, are for-profit companies, not charitable
institutions or community social clubs.”); Stemler, supra note 24, at 207 (explaining that
in this phenomenon “cash, as opposed to altruism, motivates supply-side user behavior.”).
154
See Caroline Meller-Hannich, Share Economy and Consumer Protection, in DIGITAL
REVOLUTION: CHALLENGES FOR CONTRACT LAW IN PRACTICE 119, 125 (Reiner Schulze &
Dirk Staudenmayer eds., 2016); Rodríguez-de-las-Heras, supra note 137, at 153 (observing
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All transactions that are part of this model are supported by consideration.155 These two latter characteristics, for profit and contract
basis, confirm that the TMP-PUP model operates exclusively in the
Access or the Exchange Economies and not in the Gift and the Sharing Economies.
However, what makes the TMP-PUP model unique is two additional elements. These elements are related to the temporality of the
transaction and to the consideration required of Users. In terms of
the first element, both goods and services are the assets that can be
transacted through the TMP-PUP model.156 These transactions,
however, are time-limited. Providers agree to provide services to
Users on an ad hoc or casual basis rather than a long-term basis.157
For example, Uber drivers (Providers) supply the transportation service to the Uber passengers (Users) in a casual basis. Alternatively,
when the platform is used for the provision of goods under the TMP-

that “electronic platforms are contract-based buildings. Such a contractual infrastructure
designs the liability regime and indeed allocates duties and liabilities between operators
and platform’s members. . . .”).
155
See Erez Aloni, Pluralizing the Sharing Economy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1407
(2016) (arguing that, in this phenomenon, “[c]onsumers pay for the services and goods,
and providers enjoy an additional, or main, source of income. All types of transactions are
monetized. In contractual terms, we can say that all these exchanges are supported by
consideration. . . .”); Lobel, supra note 1, at 109 (arguing that “the platform tilts the balance
away from altruistic/communal interactions to marketable/commodified exchanges.”);
Infranca, supra note 133, at 30 (arguing that “[g]ratuitous sharing, or even bartering for
that matter, does not mark the exchange of goods and services between buyers and sellers
matched through . . . platforms.”).
156
See Zale, supra note 1, at 528 (arguing that the economic driver of the “Sharing
Economy” is the monetization of two types of assets: goods or services); McPeak, supra
note 152, at 178 (describing the “Sharing Economy” as a “group of new, innovative
businesses that offer peer-to-peer goods and services through new technology.”); Rauch &
Schleicher, supra note 1, at 915 (explaining that the peer-to-peer sharing network “can
include either assets or services or both.”); John O. McGinnis, The Sharing Economy as an
Equalizing Economy, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 334 (2018) (observing that “[t]he
essence of the sharing economy is that it uses online agency to create markets in property
and jobs that were not nearly as effective previously.”).
157
See Zale, supra note 1, at 528 (explaining that one of the assets that are monetized
through this model are services, which “are provided on an ad hoc basis by individuals
offering their labor and time in exchange for a fee.”); Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 1, at
915 (observing that, within this model, one-off Users hire Providers looking for quick
gigs); Scott & Brown, supra note 10, at 587–88 (explaining that the services provided
through this phenomenon are on-demand and short-term services).
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PUP model, the transfer is a partial transfer of property rights.158 For
example, Airbnb hosts (Providers) transfer the right to possess or the
right to use the property to the Airbnb guests (Users) instead of the
entire bundle of rights (ownership). Note that while the long-term
provision of services or total transfer of the bundle of property rights
are within the technological and business capabilities of the P-PUP
model, they are not part of the TMP-PUP model because they create
a different legal liability and offer a different business model.
Regarding the second element unique to the TMP-PUP model,
the element of consideration, Users are required to pay money rather
than barter or provide any other form of consideration for the goods
or services supplied by Providers.159 Thus, the permanent or longterm provision of services as well as the selling, bartering, exchanging, and gifting of goods are excluded from the TMP-PUP model.160
158

See Kochan, supra note 101, at 945 (explaining that one of the critical features of the
phenomenon is the “exchange of interests in property and a conferral of rights to use or
benefit from real or personal property.”); Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption, supra note 65, at
92 (arguing that this phenomenon refers to “consumers who choose not to purchase
property, but rather to bargain for short-term use.”); Zale, supra note 1, at 562 (arguing
that “exclusivity of use or possession is necessarily embedded into property-sharing
activities.”). “Sharing Economy” literature usually refers to this factor as the existence of
access instead of ownership. See, e.g., GANSKY, supra note 1, at 5 (asserting that this
phenomenon “is based on network-enabled sharing—on access rather than ownership.”);
BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at xv (asserting that this phenomenon “is enabling
people to realize the enormous benefits of access to products and services over ownership.
. . .”); Lobel, supra note 1, at 110 (including “access over ownership” as one of the ten
fundamental principles of the model); Kochan, supra note 101, at 939 (contrasting access
and ownership in order to understand the phenomenon); Zale, supra note 1, at 533
(emphasizing that one of the characteristics of the model is the access to, rather than the
ownership of, property).
159
See Zale, supra note 1, at 561 (recognizing that “the monetization of assets is one of
the defining features of the sharing economy. . . .”); Oei & Ring, supra note 1, at 990
(contending that in this phenomenon, Platform Operators “enable consumers to summon
rides, rent accommodations, or hire services from peers via personal computer or a mobile
app, in exchange for payment.”); Lobel, supra note 1, at 109 (arguing that this phenomenon
“is growing exponentially, but it is not free. . . . The platform takes the saying that
everything, and everyone, has a price quite literally.”).
160
This characteristic entails that platforms mediating the transfer of the bundled
ownership are not part of the TMP-PUP model, such as: (1) Amazon, eBay, and Craigslist
(where goods are sold, part of the Exchange Economy); (2) BarterDaddy, Swapub, and
TradeMade (where barters take place, part of the Exchange Economy);(3) Simbi, Listia,
and Bunz (where goods are transferred for a digital unit of currency, part of the Exchange
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In sum, the TMP-PUP model is a for-profit, triangular legal
structure where two parties (Providers and Users) enter into binding
contracts for the provision of goods (partial transfer of the propertybundle of rights) or services (ad hoc or casual services) in exchange
for monetary payment through an online platform operated by a
third party (Platform Operator) with an active role in the definition
and development of the legal conditions upon which the goods and
services are provided.
It is important to note, and perhaps of ultimate importance, that
the PUP model and all its derivative sub-categories often operate in
regulated environments, from the provision of accommodation
services to public transport services. One of the major impacts of
the PUP model, and particularly TMP-PUP’s models, has been the
ability of Platform Operators to avoid public regulation of the activities applicable to other traditional providers. The PUP model has
allowed activities to be shifted between regulatory regimes or categories. For example, the PUP model allows Platform Operators
to be categorized as mere technology companies rather than employers, and Providers to be categorized as private contractors rather
than employees. It allows risk shifting from enterprises to individual
Providers.
Any legal analysis of the PUP model not only needs to take
account of the internal legal environment created by the Platform
Operator, but also the external regulatory environment enabling not
only the Platform Operator but the activities which it facilitates, including the underlying contractual relations among itself, the Provider, and the User. We argue that it is this dual legal environment
in which the Platform Operator dictates the terms and conditions for
the participants and may shift the location of activities in terms of
the external legal environment’s categories which constitutes a new
legal structure—the legal PUP model. Thus, it is necessary when
conceptualizing the PUP model to take account not only of PUP as
a technology or PUP as a business model, but PUP as creating an
entirely new legal structure.

Economy); and (4) Ziilch, LeftoverSwap, and FreeCycle (where donations take place, part
of the Gift Economy).
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The distinctions developed in this Article are critical because
prior scholarship has conflated the categories of economies while
also conflating the Sharing Economy with the PUP model generally
and the TMP-PUP model specifically. Furthermore, the judiciary
has struggled to categorize the various phenomena under consideration with the result that apparently incoherent decision-making
and unpredictability have crept into the legal environment. The lack
of appropriate categories and definitions has destabilized the law
surrounding the PUP model businesses.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of the different economies, including the Sharing
Economy, and the theoretical development of the PUP model—and
its subclasses the P-PUP and the TMP-PUP models—resolves a
wide range of issues that have arisen because of new internet-based
platforms. The development of the PUP model and its subclasses
addresses a major gap in our understanding of this technological development and its interaction with the legal system. We have argued
that a legally informed understanding of the Sharing Economy—
particularly, distinguishing it from the Exchange, Gift, and Access
Economies—is critical to an analysis of the phenomenon. Identifying and delineating these economies allows us to deal with the new
behaviors and practices facilitated by the technologies underpinning
the PUP model.
We have argued that the PUP model has two defining elements:
(1) a triangular legal structure of actors and legal relationships and
(2) an active Platform Operator. We have further argued that the PPUP model has two additional elements: (1) a for-profit nature and
(2) a contractual foundation for transactions. Finally, we have argued that the TMP-PUP model has two additional elements: (1)
monetary consideration from Users and (2) temporality in terms of
the provision of services or access to property.
Our analysis then differentiates the TMP-PUP model, which is
the model that embraces those highly disruptive businesses such as
Uber, Airbnb, and TaskRabbit from all other types of platform-
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based transactions.161 Thus, the TMP-PUP model excludes (1) bilateral transactions where Platform Operators directly provide the
goods or services;162 (2) transactions for the provision of permanent
or long-term services;163 (3) transactions transferring the bundle
of rights in totum;164 (4) transactions lacking considerations;165 (5)
transactions where the delivery of money is not an obligation of
Users;166 (6) transactions without a profit;167 (7) transactions where
Platforms Operators are passive actors of the structure;168 and (8)
161

Other examples of firms falling within this legal structure are: DogVacay (dog
walking services), PetCloud (pet sitting services), Eatwith (social dining services), Luxe
(valet parking services), KitSplit (renting of cameras), LiquidSpace (renting of offices),
ParkingPanda (renting of parking lots), and Capitalbikeshare (renting of bikes).
162
Therefore, firms like Zipcar (from Avis Budget Group), Car2Go (from Daimler
Group), and DriveNow (from BMW Group) are excluded from this legal structure because
they own the car fleet rented to the public. In other words, these firms are direct providers
of the goods to be rented. This situation is different from what happens with companies
such as Getaround, Turo, or Drivy, where the triangular legal structure remains. Here, the
cars rented through the platform are the ones Providers own.
163
Therefore, firms like Seek, MeetFrank, and Workable—where matching between
employers and job seekers is facilitated through a platform—are excluded from the TMPPUP model.
164
Therefore, firms like (1) Amazon, eBay, and Craigslist (where goods are sold); (2)
BarterDaddy, Swapub, and TradeMade (where goods are bartered); (3) Ziilch,
LeftoverSwap, and FreeCycle (where goods are given away); and (4) Simbi, Listia, and
Bunz (where goods are transferred for digital units of currency), are excluded from the
TMP-PUP model.
165
Therefore, firms like (1) Ziilch, LeftoverSwap, and FreeCycle (where the bundle of
rights is totally transferred without consideration); (2) CouchSurfing, TrustRoots, and
BeWelcome (where the bundle of rights over choses in possession is partially transferred
without consideration); and (3) VolunteerMatch, KiwanisInternational, and GoVolunteer
(where services are provided without consideration), are excluded from the TMP-PUP
model.
166
Therefore, firms like (1) BarterDaddy, Swapub, and TradeMade (where the
consideration is constituted by the exchange of goods); (2) SwapRight, Swapaskill, and
SkillsBarter (where the consideration is constituted by the exchange of services); and (3)
Simbi, Listia, and Bunz (where digital units of currency are used rather than money), are
excluded from the TMP-PUP model.
167
Therefore, firms like CouchSurfing, TrustRoots, and BeWelcome (where neither
Platform Operators nor Providers have a profit interest) are excluded from the TMP-PUP
model.
168
Following the explanations of the elements of the PUP model, a passive Platform
Operator would be a firm that, despite providing an online platform for the connection of
Providers and Users, does not shape all the legal relationships comprising the triangular
model, such as passive message boards (e.g., craigslist, Twitter, and Instagram). See Katz,
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transactions within the Gift Economy and, ironically, the Sharing
Economy.169
Using the frameworks we have provided, it is possible to differentiate and organize a myriad of PUP models and transactions that
have been erroneously categorized as part of the “Sharing Economy.” This step is crucial in addressing various ambiguities and is a
step towards the proper regulation of these businesses. We have
analyzed the PUP model in terms of economies and terms of
property and contract to provide a foundation for the further subcategories. In the analysis of the subclasses P-PUP and TMP-PUP
models, new legal categories arise. We believe that the PUP and
its subclasses should be considered as new models which, while
facilitating transfers and transactions through technological innovation, critically create a new legal structure. This new structure constitutes a legal environment in which the Platform Operator sets the
rules––often including rules of adjudication––and controls enforcement. Within the PUP, the TMP-PUP model arises as a specific
new legal category with the potential to classify highly disruptive
business models such as Uber, Airbnb, and TaskRabbit, providing a
legal, conceptual delimitation for the analysis, understanding, and
regulation of these models.

supra note 56, at 1072 (explaining the characteristics of passive message boards and its
differences from a direct service provider).
169
Therefore, firms like Ziilch, LeftoverSwap, and FreeCycle (part of the Gift Economy)
and CouchSurfing, TrustRoots, and BeWelcome (part of the Sharing Economy) are
excluded from the TMP-PUP model.

